Supreme Court to Review Text Message Case; Primarily of Interest to Public Employers
Yesterday the United States Supreme Court agreed to consider whether a police officer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages sent using his department-issued pager. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled earlier this year that the officer had such a privacy right. Click here to read the opinion below in City of Ontario, California v. Quon.
In Quon, the employer, the City of Ontario, distributed to its police officers pagers with texting capability. The City then audited the use of text messages by the officers to determine whether overage charges may have been caused by personal use of the service. During the audit, it discovered that Quon had sent several personal, sexually explicit text messages. Quon sued the City, asserting violations of his right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution as well as under Article I, Section I of the California Constitution. The District Court dismissed Quon's suit after a jury found that the City conducted the audit to investigate usage, not misconduct. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the City violated Quon's constitutional privacy rights by reading his private texts, and the City's articulated policies did not give Quon sufficient notice that his texts could by read by others to overcome his privacy rights.
What does this mean for employers? For most private employers, this case will have little or no impact. Federal privacy rights, such as those that come from the Fourth Amendment, apply only to public employers and not to private ones. Private California employers should watch out: California courts have sometimes applied state constitutional rights to private employers, and could rule that their employees have privacy rights in work-provided email and text systems. Still, it is a good practice for all employers, public and private and in all states, to adopt and distribute policies clearly stating that employees have no expectation of privacy in communications they make using employer-provided equipment and systems, such as email, text messages, cell phones, etc.
Supreme Court Lets Stand Ruling Allowing EEOC to Issue Subpoenas After Right-To-Sue
Yesterday the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that allows the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to continue investigating allegations of employment discrimination, and even to issue subpoenas to employers, after issuing a right-to-sue letter to the employee who filed the initial complaint. Click here to read the Ninth Circuit decision in Federal Express Corp. v. EEOC.
In order to file a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an employee must first file a complaint of discrimination with either the EEOC or an analogous state agency, a process known as "exhausting administrative remedies." Only after the EEOC issues a "right-to-sue letter" may the employee then file a lawsuit. It is not uncommon for an employee to file a complaint with the EEOC and withdraw it almost immediately, obtain the right-to-use letter and file a lawsuit, all before the EEOC has had a chance to investigate. In Federal Express, the employee did just that in order to join a pending class action lawsuit. The employer expected the EEOC to drop its investigation, but instead EEOC continued to investigate and issued a subpoena to the employer.
The Ninth Circuit enforced the subpoena, writing: "By continuing to investigate a charge of systemic discrimination even after the charging party has filed suit, the EEOC is pursuing its obligation to serve the public interest." The Ninth Circuit's decision is in line with a decision from the Third Circuit, but contrary to decisions from the Fifth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits. The Supreme Court will often take a case like Federal Express to resolve such splits between the circuit courts, but declined to do so in this case. As a result, the EEOC's investigatory powers will continue to vary depending on where a complaint is made.
Given the Supreme Court's ruling in Federal Express, employers can no longer safely assume that the EEOC will drop its investigation once it issues a right-to-sue letter. The EEOC may choose to continue investigating charges of discrimination, especially in cases involving allegations of systemic or widespread violations of anti-discrimination law. Employers (at least those in the Ninth and Third Circuits) should be prepared to comply with EEOC investigations even after the right-to-sue letter has issued.
Supreme Court to Rule on Authority of Two-Member NLRB
This week the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal in New Process Steel v. NLRB and determine whether the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or "the Board") has the authority to decide cases with only two sitting members.
The NLRB is the independent federal agency that administers the National Labor Relations Act, the primary law governing relations between unions and employers in the private sector. Typically, the NLRB is made up of five members, appointed by the President. There are currently three vacancies on the Board, leaving only two sitting members. The statute governing the NLRB's powers (29 U.S.C. § 153(b), if you really care) provides that "three members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of the Board." Nevertheless, the two remaining Board members have decided a number of cases, under the theory that as long as those two members agree, they would have formed the majority of any three-member quorum anyway.
The Court will resolve a split between the federal appellate courts. In New Process Steel v. NLRB, (the case on appeal) the Seventh Circuit held that the current two-member NLRB does have the power to decide cases. The First Circuit agreed in in Northeastern Land Services v. NLRB. However, the D.C. Circuit disagreed in Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier v. NLRB and rejected the power of a two-member Board to do anything. If you want to read more about this dispute, click here to read New Process Steel's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Court.
For most employers, New Process Steel will have little relevance--none of the cases decided by the two-member Board were particularly controversial, and none represented a significant departure from existing NLRB law. The only employers with a significant stake in the outcome of New Process Steel will be those employers whose cases were ruled on by the two-member Board. If the Court reverses New Process Steel, those cases will be reheard by a future three-member panel, and will likely be upheld.
The First Monday in October: Supreme Court Roundup
The first Monday in October traditionally marks the beginning of the United States Supreme Court's yearly term - and it provides an excellent opportunity to look at the cases the Court will be hearing this year. In an earlier post, the World of Work brought you detailed discussion of the Court's only Title VII case this term: Lewis v. City of Chicago. Here's a sampling of other labor and employment-related cases to watch for throughout the term:
This morning, in Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, the Court will consider whether an employer's attorney's investigation of an internal complaint is protected by the attorney-client privilege. The internal complaint alleged that the company was conspiring to hire individuals who were not authorized to work in the United States. The case involves a former employee's claim for witness tampering; a separate lawsuit involving the alleged conspiracy is proceeding on a separate track.
On October 7, the Court will hear a case involving the Railway Labor Act. The issue in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers is whether the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had the power to overturn, on due process grounds, an arbitration award in the railroad's favor.
On October 14, in Perdue v. Kenny A., the Court will consider whether attorney fee awards under 42 USC 1988 can be enhanced when the lawyer does a particularly good job. Section 1988 is a common basis for fees in employment-related lawsuits.
On December 9, the Court will hear Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds International. This case asks the Court to decide whether an employee bringing a claim under an arbitration agreement may sue, not only on his own behalf, but on behalf of a class of similarly situated employees. In this case, the arbitration agreement did not specifically allow class claims, but the arbitrators allowed those claims anyway.
Finally, on a date to be announced, the Court will hear Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters. This case again involves questions about arbitration. Here, the issue is whether an arbitrator (not a court) may decide whether a valid collective bargaining agreement exists.
Supreme Court to Decide Title VII Statute of Limitations Question
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed yesterday to hear a challenge to a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in a case with similar factual overtones to the Ricci case decided earlier this year. Like Ricci, this case involves a firefighter qualification test that had a disparate impact on black applicants; unlike Ricci, at issue here is the statute of limitations on a Title VII claim.
In this case, Lewis v. City of Chicago, the plaintiffs are a group of approximately 6,000 black firefighter applicants who filed charges of race discrimination with the EEOC more than 300 days after the initial announcement of their test results, but within 300 days of the hiring of the new firefighter class from which they allege they were denied consideration. The trial court held that the hiring of each new firefighter was a new violation of Title VII, so the EEOC charges were timely filed. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the “discrimination was complete when the tests were scored...and the applicants learned the results.” At issue for the Supreme Court is whether the limitations period for a Title VII claim begins to run when an employer announces the results of a test that could violate Title VII’s disparate impact provision, or if the right to sue begins only once the employer has acted on that policy.
At face value, it seems that the trial court probably got this one right and the Supreme Court should reverse the Seventh Circuit. How can an employee know what the actual disparate impact will be until the employer’s hiring decisions are actually made? If, for example, the employer’s business needs ultimately dictate that it need hire nobody, there has been no harm done regardless of the results of the test. An actual harm needs to occur before the right to sue accrues. Notwithstanding that analysis, and given the current makeup of the court, however, it is unclear which way the Court will go on this one. The World of Work will let you know when a decision is reached and how that decision may impact your workplace.
2009 Mid-Term Federal Legislative Update
We expected many changes in federal labor and employment law in 2009 - for the first time in years, Democrats control the White House and both houses of Congress and have the political ability to make significant reforms. However, not much has happened in 2009: we have only significant labor and employment bill signed into law. To be fair, President Obama and the Congress have had other things to worry about: a war or two, a lousy economy, health care and selecting a new White House dog to name a few.
But, the 2009-2010 legislative session is still not over, and Congress may yet pass some of the many labor and employment-related bills still pending. Employers may want to take note, as some of these may become law before the end of the session in 2010. Click on "continue reading" for a complete list.
Continue Reading...Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Case About Meddling International Union
The US Supreme Court just agreed to hear a case asking just how much international unions will be allowed to meddle in the affairs of their local affiliates. In Granite Rock v. Teamsters, the employer sued the International Brotherhood of Teamsters in federal court claiming that the International interfered with the relationship between the employer and the Local Teamsters union.
In Granite, the employer and the Local had reached a tentative new agreement which contained a no-strike clause. The employer alleged that the Local ratified the agreement and then engaged in a strike. Apparently a high ranking official of the International was the motivating force behind the strike. The 9th Circuit held that the employer could not sue the International because the agreement was between the employer and the Local, and did not involve the International. The Supreme Court granted cert and will hear the case, perhaps recognizing that international unions are often working behind the scenes with their local unions.
The Court will probably not hear the case until the 2010 session, and it could be some time before an opinion is issued. It is not uncommon for employers to have good relationships with local unions. Sometimes those relationships are strained through pressure from out-of-town international union officials. Currently, international unions are somewhat insulated from liability for meddling in negotiations and other ongoing business relationships between local unions and employers. Ultimately, this decision could open a new legal avenue for employers to hold international unions accountable for their actions.
Ricci v. DeStefano -- Supreme Court Holds City Violated Title VII By Rejecting Racially Disparate Test Results
.jpg)
To end its term, the Supreme Court today issued its long awaited opinion in Ricci v. DeStefano--a case that has received extra media attention because Supreme Court nominee Sonia Sotomayor was on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals panel that decided the case below. The conservative justices on the Court reversed the Second Circuit (and by extension, Judge Sotomayor) in a 5-4 decision, ruling that the city of New Haven violated Title VII by discarding the results of a firefighter promotion test where white applicants fared disproportionately better than other applicants. As one might expect, Justice Kennedy provided the swing vote and authored the majority opinion.
New Haven used the test in question to identify firefighters best qualified for promotion. Despite being objectively administered, the test's racially disproportionate results led the city to question whether it should validate the results. The city, of course, found itself in a "damned if you do, damned if you don't" position: certify the test results, and face Title VII disparate impact litigation from minority applicants; fail to certify them, and face Title VII reverse discrimination litigation from the white officers who passed but were denied a promotion. The city opted for the latter course, and, as expected, the white firefighters filed a reverse discrimination lawsuit. The city prevailed on summary judgment at the district court level, and the Second Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court found that discarding the tests violated Title VII , while certifying the test would not have been a violation of law because there was no "strong basis in evidence" for believing that the black firefighters would prevail on a disparate impact claim. The court noted that despite what otherwise would have constituted a "prima facie" showing of disparate impact race discrimination, several defenses were available to the city--namely that the exam at issue was job related, consistent with business necessity, and there existed no equally valid, less discriminatory alternative that suited the city's needs but was not adopted. The four dissenting justices disagreed, arguing that the majority's analysis was flawed because "New Haven had ample cause to believe its selection process was flawed and not justified by business necessity."
Ultimately, the Ricci decision will have little to no impact on most employers, but represents a small victory for employers (despite the positioning here that held against the city/employer). Employers can now take a somewhat more confident stand in backing test results that may demonstrate some disparate impact, so long as the test was objective and no other less discriminatory alternative exists. The Ricci decision may not last for long, however. Political condemnation by Democrats has been swift, with Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) saying that "it is less likely now that employers will conscientiously try to fulfill their obligations under this time-honored civil rights law. This is a cramped decision that threatens to erode these protections and to harm the efforts of state and local governments that want to build the most qualified workforces." Don't be surprised if Congress passes legislation down the road aimed at upending the Ricci decision.
Supreme Court Tightens Standards for Age Discrimination Plaintiffs
Yesterday the United States Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that trial courts may not use a "mixed motive" framework in federal age discrimination cases. Rather, plaintiffs in age discrimination cases must prove that "but for" their age, they would not have been discriminated against. Click here to read the Court's decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services.
Under a 1991 amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, plaintiffs may prove race, sex, religion or national origin discrimination by proving either they would not have been discriminated against "but for" their employer's unlawful motive, or if their employer had a "mixed motive," meaning that the employer had some lawful motives to take an adverse action against the employee, but also some unlawful motives. In "mixed motive" cases, employers can avoid some (but not all) liability by proving that it would have taken the same action against the employee even absent the unlawful motive. Prior to Gross, several circuit courts (including the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals) had applied the "mixed motive" framework in cases under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act, even though those statutes do not incorporate a"mixed motive" framework.
Gross is ultimately a technical case mostly of interest to employment litigators. Gross will make it incrementally more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in age discrimination and some other federal discrimination cases. Employers do not need to change their current policies and practices in light of Gross - rather, employers should continue not to discriminate on the basis of age, sex or any other characteristic protected by federal, state or local law. (Well, duh!)
Judge Sotomayor's Record Shows Even-Handed Approach to Employment Law
President Obama recently nominated Judge Sonia Sotomayor to replace outgoing Justice David Souter on the United States Supreme Court. If you're like us, you're wondering what her nomination might mean for employment law. While it's never easy to predict how a nominee will rule once on the Supreme Court (just ask George H.W. Bush), early indications are that Judge Sotomayor takes an even-handed approach to employment law issues.
In her 16-year career on the bench, first as a District Court Judge and then as a Judge on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Sotomayor has been involved in over 100 opinions on employment cases. She's ruled in favor of both employers and employees, and her decisions do not seem to be skewed one way or the other. Click here for a list of of Judge Sotomayor's employment law decisions.
If you look through this list, you'll see that she's made several rulings in favor of employers. While some conservatives are already attacking Judge Sotomayor for "judical activism," they will find no support for those charges in her employment law record. Assuming she takes this same approach on the Supreme Court, we can expect her to be a critical swing vote on future employment cases.
Tomorrow: Judge Sotomayor's Labor Record
Supreme Court Clears Pension Plan That Differentiated Pregnancy Leave Prior to the PDA
Today the U.S. Supreme Court held that an employer does not violate the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) if it pays pension benefits based in part on pre-PDA calculations that gave employees less retirement credit for pregnancy leave than for other types of medical leave. Click here to read the Court's decision in AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen.
The employer in Hulteen, AT&T, based its pension calculations on a seniority system based on years of service minus uncredited leave time. AT&T gave less credit for pregnancy absences than it did for other types of medical leaves. When the PDA was enacted in 1978, AT&T replaced its old plan a plan that provided the same service credit for pregnancy leave; it did not, however, make any retroactive adjustments for pre-PDA pregnancy leaves. Some female employees, including the plaintiff Hulteen, received less credit for pre-PDA pregnancy leaves, and therefore received smaller pensions.
The lower courts held that this violated Title VII; however, the Supreme Court reversed 7-2. Because AT&T's pension payments accord with the terms of a bona fide, non-discriminatory seniority system, they are insulated from challenge under Title VII §703(h). (The system was considered non-discriminatory because, prior to enactment of the PDA, an accrual rule limiting the seniority credit for time taken for pregnancy leave did not unlawfully discriminate onthe basis of sex.)
Supreme Court: Arbitration Provisions in Collective Bargaining Agreements Enforceable on Statutory Claims
.jpg)
Today the United States Supreme Court issued a decision of paramount importance to union employers, holding that arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) are enforceable as to statutory claims. Click here to read the decision in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett.
In Penn Plaza, several union members asserted claims against their employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, alleging that they were reassigned to different positions because of their age. The employer moved to dismiss their suits on the basis that the CBA required union members to submit any claims of employment discrimination to binding arbitration under the CBA’s grievance and dispute resolution procedures. Those motions were denied by the lower courts.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that a CBA provision that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law. Because employment-related discrimination claims are "conditions of employment" under the National Labor Relations Act, they are subject to mandatory bargaining. The court also emphasized that arbitration is an adequate means to resolve statutory claims as well as alleged contract violations.
The Penn Plaza decision reverses a long line of court cases holding that union members cannot be required to arbitrate statutory claims. This is a great outcome for union employers, who can now require union employees to arbitrate statutory claims -- generally a more cost-effective and expedient method of resolution. If your CBA does not contain such a provision (or if the provision does not provide for arbitration as the exclusive means to resolve statutory claims), you might want to consider proposing such a provision in your next contract negotiations.
Supreme Court Upholds Idaho Law on Union Speech 6-3
.jpg)
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled earlier this week that an Idaho law banning local government employers from allowing payroll deductions for political activities does not violate unions' First Amendment free speech rights. You can download the opinion here: Ysursa v. Pocatello Ed. Ass'n, U.S., No. 07-869, 2/24/09).
The Idaho Voluntary Contributions Act, enacted in 2003, prohibited public employees' unions from using payroll deductions to fund political activities, defined as “electoral activities, independent expenditures, or expenditures made to any candidate, political party, political action committee, or political issues committee or in support of or against any ballot measure.” A group of unions representing state and local employees in the state sued to challenge the VCA on the basis that it unlawfully restricted unions' First Amendment Right.
A 6-3 majority of the Supreme Court held that the VCA does not violate unions' rights: “Idaho's law does not restrict political speech, but rather declines to promote that speech by allowing public employee checkoffs for political activities,” Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the majority. Applying rational-basis review, he found that the restriction “is reasonable in light of the State's interest in avoiding the appearance that carrying out the public's business is tainted by partisan political activity.”
With that endorsement, don't be surprised if more states (particularly right-to-work states) pass similar legislation.
Supreme Court Broadens Scope of Title VII's Anti-Retaliation Protections
.jpg)
The U.S. Supreme Court issued an important decision yesterday, clarifying that employees who report discrimination in response to an employer's internal investigation are protected by the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII. Click here to download the case: Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville.
In Crawford, the plaintiff was interviewed as part of her employer's investigation into another employee's complaint of sexual harassment. In response, Crawford reported harassment that she experienced. Soon thereafter, Crawford's employment was terminated; the employer claimed the plaintiff embezzled funds, but Crawford filed a lawsuit alleging the termination was in retaliation for her participation in the investigation. The district court dismissed Crawford's lawsuit on the grounds that, while Title VII makes it unlawful to retaliate against an employee because she "opposed" sexual harassment, Crawford did not "oppose" anything; she merely answered questions in response to an internal investigation.
The Supreme Court reversed (9-0!), holding that "oppose" should be read broadly. As Justice Souter wrote:
"'Oppose' goes beyond 'active, consistent' behavior in ordinary discourse, where we would naturally use the word to speak of someone who has taken no action at all to advance a position beyond disclosing it. Countless people were known to “oppose” slavery before Emancipation, or are said to “oppose” capital punishment today, without writing public letters, taking to the streets, or resisting the government. And we would call it 'opposition' if an employee took a stand against an employer’s discriminatory practices not by 'instigating' action, but by standing pat, say, by refusing to follow a supervisor’s order to fire a junior worker for discriminatory reasons."
What does this mean for employers? For starters, the number of employees protected by Title VII's anti-retaliation provisions has significantly increased. When making employment decisions -- terminations, layoffs, discipline -- employers should include passive participants in discrimination investigations in their list of "high risk" employees. And, even though Crawford considered only Title VII, we expect courts will apply its ruling to the similar anti-retaliation provisions in other statutes as well, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and others.
Supreme Court to Hear Mixed-Motive Age Discrimination Case
.jpg)
Last week, the United States Supreme Court agreed to review Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., a case involving whether a plaintiff alleging a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act must present "direct evidence" of discrimination to be entitled to a mixed-motive jury instruction.
A mixed-motive case in one where the evidence shows that an impermissible factor - such as age - was considered in making an employment decision even if the employer also based the decision on other permissible factors. In Gross, the plaintiff prevailed after a jury trial in which the jury was instructed that it was sufficient that the plaintiff proved age was a "motivating factor" in his employer's decision to terminate his employment. (A "motivating factor" is considered an eaiser burden of proof than "direct evidence"). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the "motivating factor" standard applies only to cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (i.e., sex, race, national origin and religious discrimination claims) and that Gross needed to prove his case with direct evidence to be entitled to a mixed-motive instruction.
Do employers need to be concerned about this case? Not really. This is one of those cases that means more for us lawyers than it does for our clients. If the Court rules for Gross, it will make certain types of age discrimination marginally easier for plaintiffs, but this will not change an employer's obligation to base employment decision only on permissible factors, such as performance, and not on impermissible factors, such as age.
Supreme Court Rejects Appeal on Aliens' Right to Vote in Union Elections
Earlier this month, the United States Supreme Court declined to review a ruling from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit holding that unauthorized aliens are "employees" under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and therefore entitled to cast votes in a union election.
In Agri Processor Co. v. NLRB, the employees elected the United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 342 as their bargaining agent in 2005 election; however, the employer refused to bargain with the union on the basis that 17 of the 21 employees who cast ballots were not legally authorized to work in the United States, and therefore not "employees" under the NLRA.
In a 2-1 decision that was affirmed by the D.C. Circuit, the National Labor Relations Board held that the certification of Local 342 was valid because the voters were employees under the NLRA even if they were hired in violation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act. That decision will stand now that the Supreme Court has passed on its opportunity to review the case. With the passage of the Employee Free Choice Act appearing all but certain, authorization cards signed by unauthorized alien employees will likely be held valid as well.
U.S. Supreme Court to Hear Six L&E Cases This Term
The U.S. Supreme Court opened its 2008-2009 term on October 6 with six labor and employment law cases on its docket. (For docket information and questions presented, click on the name of the case).
- Locke v. Karass: may a public employee union may charge nonmembers for representational costs for litigation expenses incurred by the international union on behalf of other bargaining units?
- Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings & Investment Plan: is a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) is the only valid way under ERISA for a divorcing spouse to waive his or her right to the other spouse's pension benefits?
- Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County: Is an employee who cooperates with an employer-initiated investigation into alleged unlawful discrimination protected by Title VII's anti-retaliation provisions?
- Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Ass'n: does an Idaho law that prohibits local government employers from allowing employee payroll deductions for political activities violate the First Amendment free speech rights of unions and their members?
- 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett: do employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement which providies that statutory employment discrimination claims must be pursued through the contractual grievance and arbitration procedures have a right for a court to decide their discrimination claims?
- AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen: must an employer give full service credit for purposes of calculating retirement benefits for pregnancy leaves taken before the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 if the plan gave full credit for other types of temporary disability leaves?
Some of these cases (such as the Penn Plaza and Crawford cases) have the potential to make significant changes in existing law. Stay tuned to the World of Work for developments as they occur!
Supreme Court Accepts Review of AT&T Retirement Benefits Case
The Ninth Circuit ruled last August that AT&T violated Title VII by calculating the female plaintiffs' retirement benefits based on a system which denied them credit for pregnancy leaves taken before the 1978 by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, while giving credit for other types of leaves. Hard to say which way this one will go, but odds are it will be a 5-4 decision. Stay tuned.
Big Day at the Supreme Court: Four New L&E Decisions
Today the U.S. Supreme Court issued four labor and employment-related decisions; none, however, were big surprises or substantial changes in the law.First, in Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, the Court held 8-0 that an employer defending an Age Discrimination in Employment Act case bears the burden of proving a "reasonable factors other than age" or "RFOA" affirmative defense. Truth be told, most defense lawyers have assumed that it was the employer's burden to prove the affirmative defense; this decision simply confirms that assumption. Continue Reading...
Supreme Court: No "Class of One" Claims
In Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, the plaintiff alleged that she was fired not because she was a member of a protected class (such as race, sex, age, disability, national origin, etc), but simply for "arbitrary, vindictive, and malicious reasons." In other words, she was a "class of one" and her employer fired her because it simply didn't like her, and she claimed that termination violated her constitutional due process rights.
While other Supreme Court decisions had upheld the "class of one" theory outside of the employment context, in this case the Court concluded that extending the class-of-one theory to public employees would lead to undue judicial interference in state employment practices and invalidate public at-will employment.
For public employers, this is good news: had the court upheld the "class of one" theory, it would have effectively provided for lifetime employment for public employees (of course, it seems like they have that already).
For private employers, this case is purely academic and a reminder of how good you have it: there has never been a "class of one" theory in the private workplace (no matter how much some employees seem to think there is).
Supreme Court Expands Plaintiffs' Relief in Race and Age Discrimination Cases
While Gomez-Perez applies only to federal employees, Humphries will impact private-sector employers in two ways: first, unlike Title VII, Section 1981 has no damage caps and for a plaintiff, the sky is the limit; second, while Title VII does not apply to employers with under 15 employees, Section 1981 applies to all employers regardless of size.
