9th Circuit: No Compensatory or Punitive Damages in ADA Retaliation Cases
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently limited the remedies available to employees who sue for retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), ruling that the statute does not provide for punitive damages, compensatory damages or a jury trial in ADA retaliation cases. Click here to read the decision in Alvarado v. Cajun Operating Co.
Mr. Alvarado worked as a cook in defendant’s restaurant. He complained after his supervisor made allegedly discriminatory remarks related to his age and disability, and shortly afterward he received several disciplinary write-ups for poor performance. After Mr. Alvarado was ultimately terminated, he sued his former employer for, among other things, retaliation under the ADA. Prior to trial, the federal district court granted defendant’s motion in limine, barring plaintiff from seeking punitive and compensatory damages, and a jury trial, on his ADA retaliation claim on the grounds that the statute provided only equitable relief for such claims.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling by holding that the plain, unambiguous language of the ADA remedy provisions specifically enumerate only those sections of the act for which compensatory and punitive damages (and a jury trial) are available, and that the ADA anti-retaliation provision is not included in that list. Somewhat surprisingly considering the laws at issue have been on the books since 1991, the Ninth Circuit appears to be only the third Circuit Court of Appeals to have been presented with the issue, after the Seventh and Fourth Circuits (which reached similar conclusions). The court also noted that several district courts in other circuits had reached the opposite conclusion (perhaps most surprising of all), by ignoring the text of the remedy provision and instead emphasizing the overall structure of the ADA and the “expansive” intent of the 1991 amendments.
For now, the law in the Ninth Circuit on this question is clear: while still entitled to compensatory or punitive damages in disability discrimination or failure to accommodate claims under the ADA, employees may not receive those damages for ADA retaliation claims.
Our Festivus Present to Oregon Employers: Ten Things You Should Know for 2010
Wow, it's Festivus already, which means that in just a few short days it will be a brand new year! We have a Festivus present for Oregon employers to help you get ready: Ten things you need to know for 2010! (click on each blue hotlink for more information)
- All Oregon employers are required to post the SB 519 (Mandatory Meeting Ban) Notice to Employees.
- The H1N1 (or "swine:) flu is slowing down, but it's not gone. If you have concerns for you or your employees, Oregon has a great Flu Hotline.
- As if we needed another reason to investigate complaints of unlawful harassment, the Oregon Court of Appeals recognized a claim for negligent failure to investigate.
- Leave for Military Spouses: Employers with 25 or more employees in Oregon must provide leave to spouses of service members prior to deployment and during leave from active duty.
- In 2010, you might have a greater duty to accommodate employees' religious dress and practices.
- Domestic Violence Leave and Accommodations: Employers may not discriminate against victims of actual or threatened stalking, sexual assault or domestic violence, and must make reasonable accommodations for such employees.
- In 2010, you (and your employees!) may no longer talk on the phone while driving (unless it's with a hands-free device).
- Oregon's minimum wage will remain $8.40/hour.
- Oregon kept its disability discrimination law in tune with the federal Americans with Disabilities Act.
- Oregon has new rest and meal break regulations.
And on that note, we're off to put up our festivus pole (aluminum, high strength-to-weight ratio), air our grievances, and commit feats of strength. Happy festivus, and see you in 2010!
9th Circuit: Independent Contractor Can Assert Disability Claim Under Rehabilitation Act
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled recently that an independent contractor may assert a disability claim against an employer under the Rehabilitation Act. Click the link to read the opinion on Fleming v. Yuma Regional Medical Center.
The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in programs conducted by Federal agencies, in programs receiving Federal financial assistance, in Federal employment, and in the employment practices of Federal contractors. The standards for determining employment discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act are the same as those used in Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
In Fleming, an anesthesiologist who worked as an independent contractor sued the medical center at which he worked, alleging a discriminatory constructive discharge. The trial court dismissed the case on the basis that Fleming was an independent contractor and that the Rehabilitation Act applied only to employee-employer relationships. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the Rehabilitation Act provides a cause of action to any individual subjected to disability discrimination by any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. While the Rehabilitation Act adopts the standards that are applied under the ADA, it does not adopt the ADA's limitation to the employee-employer relationship.
Independent contractors are not considered "employees" for purposes of most employment discrimination laws, and many employers hire independent contractors to avoid potential liability under such laws. Fleming shows that, at least for employers covered by the Rehabilitation Act, independent contractors may still find ways to seek the protections of those laws despite their "non-employee" status. In addition, many employers incur significant tax and other liabilities by misclassifying people as "independent contractors" when they really should be treated as employees. For more information, the Internal Revenue Service offers this guidance for determining whether someone is or is not correctly classified as an independent contractor.
EEOC Updates H1N1 Guidance
The H1N1 virus (aka "swine flu") continues to spread. Is your workplace prepared? Are your policies and procedures legally compliant? In order to help employers, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) updated its guidance for employers titled "Pandemic Preparedness in the Workplace and the Americans with Disabilities Act." (Click title to download). The EEOC guidance answers several common questions relating to H1N1 and compliance with the ADA. For example:
- May an employer send employees home if they display influenza-like symptoms during a pandemic? Yes. Employees who become ill with flu-like symptoms at work should leave the workplace. Directing such workers to go home is not a disability-related action if the illness is akin to seasonal influenza or the 2009 spring/summer H1N1 virus.
- How much information may an employer request from employees who report feeling ill at work or who call in sick? Employers may ask employees if they are experiencing flu-like symptoms, such as fever or chills and a cough or sore throat. Employers must maintain all information about employee illness as a confidential medical record in compliance with the ADA.
- May an employer require employees to wear face masks or gloves, or gowns to reduce the transmission of the H1N1 or flu virus? Yes. An employer may require employees to wear personal protective equipment during a pandemic.
- May an employer require its employees to adopt infection-control practices, such as regular hand washing, at the workplace? Yes. Requiring regular hand washing, coughing and sneezing etiquette, and proper tissue usage and disposal, does not implicate the ADA.
The guidance addresses these and many other common H1N1 questions. In short, the EEOC is directing employers not to panic, to take the H1N1 outbreak seriously, but also to treat it no differently than the regular seasonal flu -- at least from an employment law perspective. For more information, consult the EEOC guidance or contact your employment law attorney.
Another Circuit Court Agrees: ADA Amendments Act is Not Retroactive
Congress did not intend for the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) to be retroactive, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled yesterday, and applied pre-ADAAA law to dismiss an employment discrimination claim. Click here to read the court's decision in Lytes v. DC Water and Sewer Authority.
Congress passed the ADAAA in 2008 and the new law became effective January 1, 2009. The ADAAA significantly expanded the definition of "disabled" under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The Lytes court reviewed the legislative history of the ADAAA, and could not find in that history any indication that Congress intended the law to apply retroactively. The court also noted that Congress signaled its intend that the law not apply retroactively when it gave the ADAAA a specific effective date.
The DC Circuit joins the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which also ruled in EEOC v. Agro Distribution, LLC that the ADAAA is not retroactive. Notably, the Department of Labor has also taken the position that the law should not apply retroactively. And, at least for now, it appears that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission agrees.
Lytes and Agro Distribution are important cases for employers defending ADA claims; they make clear that for claims arising before January 1, 2009, pre-ADAAA standards of what constitutes a "disability" are likely to apply. For more information on the ADAAA, click here for the World of Work's ADAAA coverage.
Bus Driver's "Shy Bladder Syndrome" a Disability
A school bus driver who was demoted after his "shy bladder syndrome" left him unable to comply with his employer's drug testing procedures may proceed with claims under the Americans with Disabilites Act (ADA) according to a recent ruling from a Tennessee federal court. Click here to read the full opinion in Melman v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville.
In Melman, the plaintiff was required to submit to random drug tests. During two tests he could not provide an "adequate" urine sample, and explained that he could not because of a "shy bladder." A urologist diagnosed the plaintiff with paruresis (aka shy bladder syndrome) and offered to perform the urine sampling via catheterization. The employer declined that offer. Instead, it placed the plaintiff on unpaid leave, required him to attend a drug rehabilitation program at his own expense, and demoted him to a position as a bus monitor. (Notably, the plaintiff ultimately did provide a negative sample obtained via catheter.) The court denied the employer's motion to dismiss, holding that shy bladder syndrome substantially limited the plantiff's major life function of eliminating bodily waste.
Employers with drug testing programs should take note: employees who are unable to comply with standard drug testing procedures may have a qualifying disability, especially given the more liberal standards under the ADA Amendments Act. Employers should not shy away (okay, bad pun) from engaging in the interactive process with the employee to find ways that the employee can comply with the procedures - such as providing a sample through catheterization. The International Paruresis Association also provides suggestions for accommodating shy bladder syndrome.
Supreme Court Tightens Standards for Age Discrimination Plaintiffs
Yesterday the United States Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that trial courts may not use a "mixed motive" framework in federal age discrimination cases. Rather, plaintiffs in age discrimination cases must prove that "but for" their age, they would not have been discriminated against. Click here to read the Court's decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services.
Under a 1991 amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, plaintiffs may prove race, sex, religion or national origin discrimination by proving either they would not have been discriminated against "but for" their employer's unlawful motive, or if their employer had a "mixed motive," meaning that the employer had some lawful motives to take an adverse action against the employee, but also some unlawful motives. In "mixed motive" cases, employers can avoid some (but not all) liability by proving that it would have taken the same action against the employee even absent the unlawful motive. Prior to Gross, several circuit courts (including the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals) had applied the "mixed motive" framework in cases under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act, even though those statutes do not incorporate a"mixed motive" framework.
Gross is ultimately a technical case mostly of interest to employment litigators. Gross will make it incrementally more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in age discrimination and some other federal discrimination cases. Employers do not need to change their current policies and practices in light of Gross - rather, employers should continue not to discriminate on the basis of age, sex or any other characteristic protected by federal, state or local law. (Well, duh!)
Driving Not a "Major Life Activity" Under ADA
Is driving a car a major life activity under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)? No, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently concluded, joining two other federal circuit courts that have held that just because a person cannot drive does not mean that person meets the legal definition of "disabled." Kellogg v. Energy Safety Services, Inc.
Kellogg, who has epilepsy, sued her employer alleging disability discrimination. Kellogg asserted that because she is not allowed to drive due to the risk of seizure, she is substantially limited in the major life activity of "driving." After Kellogg prevailed on her claim at a jury trial, The Tenth Circuit reversed. (The Tenth Circuit covers Oklahoma, Kansas, New Mexico, Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah.)
The court held that driving is merely a "means to an end," and not a major life activity in and of itself. For some plaintiffs, an inability to drive may prevent them from engaging in other major life activities (such as working), but because Kellogg presented no evidence that she was substantially impaired in any activity except driving, she failed to prove she was "disabled." The Tenth Circuit thus joins both the Second and Eleventh Circuits in holding that driving is not a major life activity.
Don't expect Kellogg to set precedent for long: this case almost certainly would have been decided differently under the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA), which goes into effect January 1, 2009. Under the much broader definition of "disability" under the ADAAA, Kellogg's epilepsy alone almost certainly would have qualified her for the protections of the ADA. For more on the ADAAA, check out the World of Work's coverage, here.
President Bush Signs ADA Amendments Act
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As expected, President Bush yesterday signed the ADA Amendments Act ("ADAAA") into law, significantly expanding the scope of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The final version of the law can be downloaded here. The World of Work has been actively covering the law as it wound its way through Congress, and you can follow our reporting here.
The ADAAA goes into effect January 1, 2009. To help you get ready, Stoel Rives is offering free seminars on the ADAAA in its Portland, Boise and Seattle offices on December 2, 2008. For more information and to register, click one of these links:
Failure to Accommodate Disabled Employee May Result in Constructive Discharge
According to a recent Americans with Disabilities Act case from the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, a failure to accommodate an employee's disability may result in a constructive discharge and expose the employer to the same kind of liability it would face had it terminated an employee because of a disability.
In Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio Inc., Talley, a former store cashier with severe arthritis, could not stand more than 15 minutes without extreme pain. She requested a stool to sit on while working, but the employer refused the request because employees complained of "favoritism" and wanted stools of their own. After the employer refused her request for an accommodation, Talley quit her job and sued for disability discrimination under the ADA, claiming that her employer's refusal to accommodate her forced her to quit.
The Sixth Circuit agreed that Talley proved a claim for constructive discharge--in other words, the employer made her working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign. If Talley proves her case to a jury, her former employer can be liable for several years' of backpay damages, as well as attorney's fees and possibly even punitive damages.
This case underscores employers' obligation to provide reasonable accommodations for disabled employees. While most anti-discrimination laws do not allow "favoritism," the ADA is different: an employer does have an obligation to provide disabled employees with accommodations (such as giving a disabled cashier a stool) that non-disabled employees do not receive. Perceived favoritism is simply not a defense. For technical assistance in complying with the ADA, check out the U.S. Department of Justice's ADA Page.
